What is also of concern are the disquieting signs of fissures within the military organization itself. Even before the unfortunate assassination of Ms. Bhutto, there were several suicide bombings within the cantonment areas in Rawalpindi, with some of the suicide bombers suspected to be of military or ex-military origins. I think that the possibility exists that Gen. Musharraf may be cut loose by the military if such fissures continue to grow publicly, since this threatens the integrity of the military organization itself.

All told, these are very worrisome signs both for Pakistan and the general security and stability of the greater region, with the possibility of appalling bloodshed. Of course, often things appear worse than they are, and I hope this is one of them.

nitin,
I think there are important differences between this situation and the forces that led Ayub Khan to his exit. At the time, power simply shifted internally, within the same general groupings. This time however, new political actors are emerging on the scene, and their interests are not neccesarily aligned with the groups that have held power previously. Also, in previous occasions, the Americans had considerable leverage (hence the 3 A’s), but here the asassination of Ms. Bhutto is an unambiguous signal-that the influence of the third A-America, has significantly weakened and is probably close to non existent. In other words, there maybe a fundamental shift in the underlying *political* paradigm of Pakistan. Secondly, given that america is so weak, traditional political groups have been marginalized and weakened by the Army, which in turn is showing an inability to hold things together. I leave the remaining logical conclusions to your imagination.

You are making a sophisticated point which — notwithstanding my use of the word “modern” to describe the Pakistani military — I largely agree with.

There is clearly a difference between the notion of “modern” in the sense of how an institution is organized, resourced, run etc. and the notion of “modernity” in the sense of how such an institution thinks and deploys its capabilities. I’d used the word in the former sense — you are pointing out the latter meaning.

Because the military has appropriated more national resources than any other Pakistani institution, it has uniquely been able to maintain a modern structure. It is this that enables it to — legitimately — claim it alone can hold the country together.

As I noted in my post, however, the military has also crowded out Pakistan’s civil political processes. Given this, I agree with you, that it clearly isn’t an instrument of “modernity” advancement in Pakistan.

Best regards

I agree with your analysis of the forces pushing/promoting Musharraf’s continued position vis a vis the military. As of yet there is no substantial evidence that a wedge has been driven between Musharraf and the army high command, though not for the want of trying by various politicians.

I won’t quibble with your characterising the army as the only institution capable of holding the country together. I would point to the term ‘modern’ being used to describe the army as somewhat problematic. The army in Pakistan strikes me as still being a very colonial institution in the place it occupies with respect to both state, society and economy in Pakistan – which is not really a place that armies tend to occupy in countries one usually think of as modern. You might, perhaps, argue that the army occupies this space because it is the only modern institution in the country, while other institutions are not – that view would see the army as an agent of ‘modernity’. But I think Pakistani history would suggest that the army has inhibited the maturing of other institutions and placed them in positions of dependency. It is a problematic agent of modernity because as an institution it seeks to ensure its own interests first and foremost. And while the army certainly claims that its interests and the nation’s are the same – on a local level this is problematic given that it competes locally with other social, economic and political groups for influence, wealth and power.

A good example would be how recently Musharraf bulldozed the judiciary of the country. You can’t modernize the judicial institutions of a country by gutting it and appointing bribed Shariat Court Judges to the High Courts. Another example is how all the billions in aid from the USA were allocated to the army, navy and airforce, rather than to local law enforcement such as the Frontier Corps, Rangers or police who are the ones directly tasked with dealing with the militants in the tribal areas.

For those who remember the manner of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s exit, what Krishna and you suggest will be familiar. The forces that support this argument are (a) the institutional interests of the Army and (b) the US having built alternatives to Musharraf within the Army. The forces that oppose this are (a) Musharraf’s placement of his loyalists in key positions and (b) the factional split within the military establishment between Musharraf & Co and what I call Gul & Co.

I’d agree with Primary Red in the sense that the army is the only modern institution that has capability to hold the country together. You might contend that the political party establishments, judiciary, the civil bureaucracy or even the religious organisational networks qualify: but the question is of the ability to hold together a country during simultaneous multiple crises—Balochistan, NWFP, Northern Areas while fighting off the likes of Bhutto’s killers in the middle of Rawalpindi. (I’m not even sure that the MQM can run Karachi in a crisis)

By the way, I couldn’t help raising an eyebrow at the author of this post’s claim that the military is Pakistan’s only modern institution. Thats a rather tall claim.

http://www.chapatimystery.com/archives/homistan/round_up_ix.html#more-1394

He is now totally isolated, and open to attack from all quarters. When she was alive, her presence provided him with room for maneouver, and sort of mitigated the threat from the Islamists who are after his blood. Now this is no longer possible and it is a question of when he loses power, not whether. In itself, such an event may not have been such a bad thing, but like her or not, Ms Bhutto did have supporters and her assassination has created a political vacuum, with no one in a likely position to take control over the PPP and its base like she did. They are now a constituency for the Islamists and whoever is left to take over and lead. I doubt, for example, that Mr Sharif is in any position to control the flow of events henceforth.

Mr. Musharraf and the military’s days of total control over Pakistan are, I think, now over. It is now a question of whether this power vacuum will be peacefully filled, or whether there is going to be considerable civil strife, I also think that with Ms. Bhutto’s assassination, American policy options in Pakistan are now nonexistent, and their leverage is now more limited than it ever was, and the three A’s that determined Pakistan’s destiny are now only two. Of course, it is not clear that this is such a bad thing.

It’s not clear how effective she would have been. Her past performance as PM was not that inspiring.

Best regards

What should we expect now?

For eg., it takes a lot of pressure off Mush since she was supposed to be a check on him, and he was expected to share his leverage in Pakistani politics with her. Thats not needed anymore.

For Al-Qaeda, elections(..and coming to power of Bhutto..) would have meant some semblance of stability, resulting in more attention being given to its activities in NWFP and FATA. That might not happen anymore and it can continue increasing its influence by subverting the social structure there..(..See the articles from B. Raman about info on this..).