Let’s call Pakistan’s bluff with Operation Markarap
In today’s Mint, Sushant and I argue that moving our troops back will compel the Pakistan army to act against the Taliban; and because it is incapable of doing so, will cause the United States to realise that there is no alternative to dismantling the military-jihadi complex.
Sooner or later, the Obama administration will come to realise that it has no way to make the Pakistani military establishment seriously fight and defeat the jihadi groups, which includes the Taliban, al-Qaeda and outfits like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. When that moment comes, Barack Obama will need to choose between direct confrontation with the Pakistani military-jihadi complex and colossal strategic defeat—in the form of acceptance of a radical Islamist state with a well-developed nuclear weapons capability. It is in India’s interests that this point comes sooner rather than later. Needless to say, it is in India’s interests that the United States dismantle the military-jihadi complex. Clearly, this is far more important than merely putting some Lashkar-e-Taiba leader behind bars for carrying out the 26/11 attack on Mumbai.
Already, the Pakistani military establishment is under severe pressure from the United States to stop sponsoring jihadi militant groups on the one hand, and to actually join the fight against them on the other. Now, even in the unlikely event that the ISI decides to dismantle its jihadi connections, the army will still find it impossible to purposefully prosecute a counter-insurgency war against the Taliban. Why? Because the dominant belief among Pakistani military personnel—across the ranks—is that it is the United States that is the real enemy and the Taliban are righteous fighters for the Islamic cause. One only has to imagine what a brigade commander would say to his troops to motivate them to fight their compatriots to realise that the Pakistani army is incapable of fighting the Taliban. In a way, those who argue that the Pakistan army lacks the capacity to fight this war are right: but this is a lack of capacity that no amount of night-vision goggles and helicopter gunships can ameliorate. This unpalatable reality is obfuscated behind the India bogey—the pretence that the Pakistani army could do much better against the Taliban if only it didn’t have to defend itself from its much stronger adversary to its east.
If the ‘India threat’ were to recede, Pakistan—and for that matter the United States—will have no more excuses left to avoid having to do what is necessary. New Delhi should, therefore, call Pakistan’s bluff by mounting what we propose to call Operation Markarap.
First, the new central government, at the highest levels, must categorically declare that Pakistan need not fear an Indian military attack so long as the Pakistan army is engaged in a battle against Taliban. Now, such a verbal commitment might not convince the military brass in Rawalpindi, but it is likely to play well in Washington.
Second, India should move back some of the Indian army strike formations currently deployed in Rajasthan and Punjab. Such a bold, strategic move will not only make India’s verbal assurances credible, but will immediately result in irresistible pressure on the Pakistani army to commit more of its troops to the western border. According to our rough estimate the Pakistan army can shift around 150 infantry battalions (around 150,000 troops) to its western front without lowering its presence along the Line of Control.
Since the risk of Pakistani armoured columns rolling into India across the international border is not serious at this time, India can easily afford to move several divisions of its strike corps away from the border to more inland positions. Such military movements can be accomplished without affecting border security. Indeed, this is where India can exploit the existence of nuclear weapons to its advantage—for nuclear deterrence makes such strategic moves possible by lowering the risk of a conventional war. And even if the Pakistan army irrationally tries to exploit the Indian move by launching a conventional attack along the border— it will be hopelessly isolated internationally, not to mention at serious risk of yet another military defeat at the hands of the Indian armed forces. In the nearly seven years after Operation Parakram, the Indian army has improved its mobility sufficiently to be able to quickly rebuff a foolhardy invasion.
Third, India should proceed with the normalisation process in Jammu & Kashmir that includes reducing the visible presence of security forces in population centres. At the same time, this should be accompanied by a greater vigilance along the Line of Control to prevent the infiltration of jihadi militants. It is conceivable that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will attempt to heighten tensions with India by increasing the tempo of terrorist attacks in Kashmir—as well as other parts of India—in a bid to maintain its alibi. An analysis of the reports of infiltration attempts this year suggests that the jihadis are exploring non-traditional, harder routes in Northern Kashmir. This calls for the Indian army to change its post-Kargil posture from merely holding the heights to proactively curbing jihadi movements in the valleys.
Finally, Indian diplomacy must extract maximum advantage—mainly in Washington, but also in other capitals—by signaling India’s invaluable role in helping the international community solve its “migraine”. It is important to remember that there will be four, if not eight more years of the Obama administration. Cooperating on Af-Pak will provide a positive basis for engaging it and will provide India with greater leverage in negotiations over other contentious issues.
Given that what passes for Pakistan policy is an astonishingly trivial game of dossiers-and-lawsuits, India won’t be worse off by mounting Operation Markarap. In fact, India has nothing to lose from engaging in coercive diplomacy of a different kind.
(The version published in Mint is slightly shorter. In case you’ve not figured out why we call the operation Markarap, its explained in the newspaper version)
It is sad to note that the Acorn too has fallen for the Pakistani ploy of playing the India-card as its excuse to avoid obliterating the taliban.
No one is as blind as one who refuses to see. The Pakistanis “refuse to see”. If excuse ‘X’ is eliminated, Pakistan would come up with excuse ‘Y’. What if, after troop re-deployment the Pakistanis come up with a new excuse, while simultaneously upping infiltration? Where do we go from there? Re-deploy troops again after calling Pakistan’s bluff? The Pakistanis are determined to not see the truth. No action on our part will convince them.
India should tie any pull back of troops to successful prosecution of 26/11 perpetrators. Troop pull-back can be a good thing for India; but must not come unless there is overt and visible action by Pakistan towards dismantling the terror infrastructure. Even a few weeks ago there were reports of massive attempts at infiltrating the LoC; any move at this stage to push the Army back could prove catastrophic. Like the (erstwhile) LTTE used to clamour for a ceasefire when their backs were to the wall, the Pakistani Army seeks pull-back of troops when its back is to the wall.
Ultimately, no amount of U.S. pressure will make Pakistan completely turn against the Taliban as long as its generals believe supporting the Taliban is in their self-interest. This is a long term war. Short term “US Pressure” can only achieve limited success. The Pakistani establishment knows exactly how to play the US administrations and before too long, Barack Obama will be seeking re-election.
Nitin,
Before people (here in the comment section) connect strategic troop withdrawal with the risk of increased infiltration, I think it should be clarified that the proposed troop withdrawals are not from the actual border deployments.
If I understand the proposal correctly, it means withdrawing a unit based near, say, Jaisalmer and shifting it to somewhere near Jaipur. If so, this will have no adverse impact on infiltration across the International Border. As long as the manpower deployed at the IB and LOC is not changed, strategic troop withdrawals have no real connection with border security.
Nitin,
It is conceivable that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will attempt to heighten tensions with India by increasing the tempo of terrorist attacks in Kashmir—as well as other parts of India—in a bid to maintain its alibi.
If, as you say, “diversionary” terror strikes in India could increase, it is not clear how large-scale troop withdrawal from the border would help. If anything, such a decision wouid only constrain India’s options in the event of a terror attack.
Interestingly, placing troops away from the border entails abandoning – for the moment – the much-publicized “Cold Start”strategy of stationing agile offensive formations close to the Pakistani border for limited conventional retaliation…
BOK
As long as the manpower deployed at the IB and LOC is not changed, strategic troop withdrawals have no real connection with border security.
Exactly.
photonman,
Unless you’re saying that a military invasion of Pakistan, across the international border, in retaliation for cross-border terrorism is a feasible option, then it makes no difference.
Regardless of what the official position on Cold Start is, there’s nothing in a doctrine that can’t be changed. It can also be argued that if we have invested in capabilities to make Cold Start feasible, they will help the armed forces respond faster to a border emergency.
Nerus,
The entire point is that it is far better to use the opportunity for the US to take on the military-jihadi complex than to play that absurd game of demanding that Pakistan take action against terrorist accused. We’ve demanded that Pakistan take action against terrorists since the 1980s. It took 30 years for them to admit that a terrorist was Pakistani, and that too because Kasab had the misfortune of getting caught.
Let’s acknowledge that some strategies have failed.
And no, we know Pakistanis won’t see the truth. But we’re not trying to convince them.
To my understanding, relations with Pakis are going to be turbulent in the times ahead, much to the interest of the U.S., if we read deeper into the recent comments on Pakistan by Hillary Clinton.
Pakistan’s civil government should understand that the U.S. game plan would rather revert back the relations to the 70’s and it is up to the Pakis how they would want it to be!
There is no other solution than allowing AfPak tribals access to the Arabian sea and also a conduit for increased interaction with a free market economy like India.
We all understand that Improved Indo-pak relations are not in the interest of China, U.S. and the Paki army but to the detriment of the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Congratulations to the pakistanis. They have been succesful in creating illogical and lahori logic doubts in Indians.
Today their excuse is the Indians are at 50 km from the border. Say we give off that excuse by moving to 500 km from border. What stops Pakistan to give the excuse that Indians are only 500( add your zeros) km from the border. How far is Swat from islamabad/ rawalapindi? So out of 5 lakh soldiers which they have, all 5 lakh are on border and waiting for the Indians to cross the line? What happened to soldiers in their bases? Why couldnt the peace garrisons mobilize, Cant they top up their war reserves to include Indian war and then move?
What happens if the next excuse is because India has nukes, you will start “itkahs” operation (shakti) and after that excuse is India exists, will you start “aidni” operation?
There are excuses and then there are excuses.
Nitin,
Your point is that it is possible to withdraw some offensive positions without hurting counter insurgency capability. Point taken.
>>And no, we know Pakistanis won’t see the truth. >>But we’re not trying to convince them.
Your point is that by acceding to their demand, we leave them no facade to justify inaction against the Taliban.
My point is that once this ludicrous demand is acceded to, the next ludicrous demand will prop up. Even after admitting the involvement of their “Non-state” actor citizens in the 26/11 massacre, they have kept up the charade of ‘inadequate evidence’ to avoid taking action. This stone-walling pattern of behavior can be expected to continue even after troop-withdrawal. The next thing Pakistan would demand will be withdrawal of troops from the LoC in Kashmir. An inch often leads to a mile ..
Who are we trying to convince? The US? Do they need convincing that we are not the enemy? Public statements by their officials have already debunked the India-threat bogey.
And not to forget, troop withdrawal is not without domestic negative politcal consequences for the government. In the event of a terror strike, even perfunctory withdrawals from say Punjab would give the opposition a stick to beat the government with. A government on the back foot cannot be decisive when genuine circumstances call for it.
Bottomline: Pakistani demands will not end with troop withdrawal. Pakistan has no qualms about being ‘shown up’. Acceding to ludicrous demands will only embolden more demands, and expose the government to accusations from the opposition.
Nitin,
My point was this:
1. India doesn’t seem to have too many options with which to dissuade Pakistan from waging unconventional war. Other than the obvious covert option, IMO India’s options are (broadly) either diplomacy or military strikes. Importantly, diplomacy’s effectiveness also depends on having the means and the intent of using force : we are seeing its converse now…
Hence IMO a credible military option is essential. And obviously such options would involve crossing the border. And response time is of the essence.
2. So bringing back troops from the border will degrade India’s capacity – and hence credibility – to launch a quick response. When terror strikes again – as you said it might – India’s military option would be non-existent, and diplomacy can only do so much without a workable military option. And the benefit is not clear to me.
> In fact, India has nothing to lose from engaging in coercive diplomacy of a different kind.
This is unusual woolly-headedness from the Acorn.
Pray how can a troop withdrawal that exposes us to infiltrators (or rather, increases the likelihood of successful infiltrations) constitute coercive diplomacy? Unless one has graduated from the JNehru school of ‘give it away’ diplomacy.
Removing troops will prompt pakistan to say “look i told you so — those troops were there to threaten me”. Further, the day will not be far off then when pakistan will say “actually, thats not all — im also making nukes because of india. So, first ask them to stop.”
The MMS victory seems to have lulled the Acorn into believing that ‘slippery slope diplomacy’ will work.
Hi Nitin,
Your idea is interesting.
The problem I see is that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex serves the interests of China. My guess is that the trillions of dollars the Chinese have gives them effective control over US policy, at least in the sense that they have the power to veto a US decision to switch sides to India and demand dissolution of the military-jihadi complex. To put it bluntly, the Obama administration needs to prevent the Chinese from reducing their dollar hoard. After all, if the Chinese start to reduce their dollar hoard, there will probably be a big reduction in the value of the dollar. This would hurt the Chinese, but it will hurt the US more. Economic recovery in the US is more important than anything likely to happen in either Pakistan or India, for the Obama administration.
The other problem is that the Pakistan army will argue that the Indians can redeploy to the border in a week, while their troops fighting the Taliban cannot be redeployed to the border if they are involved in counterinsurgency. So the Pakistanis can and will argue that the Indian threat to Pakistan is real, and troops cannot be reassigned to counterinsurgency. A few people in the US elite are committed supporters of Pakistan and will buy this argument. Others will be frustrated, but probably not a lot more frustrated than they are now. After all, from the US perspective Pakistan’s reluctance to redeploy now is inexplicable and frustrating.
This doesn’t mean that it is not a good idea to redeploy so that it is clear that India is not planning to attack. After all, one implication of 11/26 is that having the Indian army deployed to be ready to attack Pakistan, given the current equipment of the Indian army, doesn’t seem to mean much. Redeploying might get you some concessions from the US. It also might give the Indian army a rest. But it seems to me unlikely that it will radically shift US attitudes toward India and Pakistan.
But as usual, this is a little long. If you want to read more from me, there is always my blog at the address given above.
Ray,
AG,
The Indian army’s strike corps in Punjab and Rajasthan don’t protect us from infiltrators. It’s the BSF that guards the borders. So rest assured, you won’t be any less safe from the infiltrator. (We’re actually advising greater vigilance along the LoC, so you might be safer)
Second, yes, Pakistan would be right (and we will be ready to admit) that our strike corps are meant for threatening them. That’s why moving them indicates we are threatening them a little less.
Finally–and this addresses Nerus’s concerns as well—acceding to one demand doesn’t mean we have to accede to all. Sometimes acceding to a small demand helps to not accede to bigger ones.
@Ray,
Dude you have a point about China—although I’m not too sure it’ll play that way. The Chinese are not unworried about the Islamic angle: this here is not a mere thuggish junta or personality cult. Xinjiang is in their crosshairs.
@Nitin,
The acid test of the whole exercise is whether your friend Barack has the convlction to stay and win. He might already have calculated that he should cut and run, and this AfPak buffalo is meant to merely provide him space and excuse. NYT today says they are negotiating unofficially of course with Mullah Omar and that Hekmatyar dude.
In any case, I think the chances of Manmohan Singh wearing a technicolour turban are higher than him announcing that we won’t attack Pakistan. The opposition will eat him up before lunch.
Don’t you think the best strategy is to do nothing. The fight for control over Pakistan, is being carried out by two factions, one of who may eventually become victorious. India should not take sides in this fight. Once the winner is known, India may take appropriate action. Till then as a responsible neighbor, it should just watch & safeguard itself, to ensure that the spill over of this factional fight does not affect India’s security.
This analysis, which calls for moving Indian conventional forces away and relying on a nuclear threat to thwart Pakistani adventurism is seriously flawed on two counts
1) India has a “No First Use” policy for Nuclear Weapons. That means that if a Pakistani conventional attack should occur (as did occur in 1947, 1965 1971 and 1999), India would not have the forces to resist, nor would India be able to use nuclear weapons unless Pakistan used them first.
2) The future of the world lies in reducing the threat of nuclear war, not increasing it by foregoing the possibility of using conventional weapons and choosing to deliberately place the threat of using nuclear weapons as a priority (as the authors have suggested).
You need to think this thing through fully.
Shiv,
Hey we said move the forces back, not disband the army!
Redeploying the strike formations does not rule out our ability to mount a conventional defence against a Pakistani invasion…but yes, it does make it more difficult. There is a risk involved and it is a risk I believe is worth taking.
Deterrence will hold. We may have declared our NFU policy, but the Pakistani general staff don’t take us on essentially what is our word, and certainly won’t bet their houses on it.
@Shiv,
I don’t know about you, but if the Pakistanis invade and for some reason our armed forces can’t beat them back, I’d say use the nukes…NFU and future of the world be damned.
hmmm…Why not give Pakistan Kashmir and what they want?
Man, with this Congress win, lots of people have started changing color :)- Very good.
Why always India has to act while fact is, its Pak that is sponsoring, sending terrorists to India?
While Mumbai burnt for 70 hours, Pranab Babu is busy sending letters to Pakistan.
India should do all it can to facilitate a Taliban takeover in Pakistan. That is the best way to remove the fig leaf that there is somehow a difference between the Pakistani Army, the Taliban and the Pakistani State. Of course the Americans may eventually try to strike a deal with the “Good” Taliban, with the “Good” faction occupying the same space as the Pakistani Army today. But the ensuing confusion will provide India with the perfect excuse to act rearrange the region in its favor.
Of course, this depends on Indian will and planning, which seem to be either missing or extremely slow acting.
Nitin,
1) The strike formations are in Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura. Arent these far enough from the border?
2) How much work has actually been done on the ground level to implement the Cold Start doctrine is debatable. Almost 10 years after the doctrine was first published, there is no Self Propelled Arty, no integral air assets with the holding corps to implement cold start. No Integrated Battle Groups have been set up yet. Without these, cold start is just a paper exercise.
How can the Pakistanis claim that they are afraid of the Indians when the Indian posture is as defense oriented as it can be, given the circumstances?
3) Even if – as you say – we call the Pakistanis bluff and remove everything that they consider to be threatening to them from the border, what is the guarantee that Pakistanis will then take effective steps to fight the Taliban? My bet is that they will continue the Charade and continue to run circles around the Indian and the American foreign policy establishments. They can easily do this by running sham operations like in the Swat valley or by inventing yet another ‘threat’ from India.
4) Lets say we remove what we consider to be all offensive formations from the border and there is a unconventional terrorist spectacular in India. It will take weeks (possibly months) for us to bring any military pressure to bear on Pakistan. Meanwhile, the wheels of international diplomacy will continue to turn and tremendous pressure will be brought to bear on India, to make sure that nothing untoward happens to their Afghan war effort. Do you think it will be possible for Indians to stand up to that? (Hint: they havent in the past).
5) If we call the Pakistanis bluff and force them to engage the Taliban, what stops an ambitious and tactically brilliant Pakistani Army or ISI commander to set up an [b]unconventional[/b] terrorist spectacular in India, specifically to provide an excuse to turn around their forces and bring them back to their Eastern border? (there are indications that this is the true reason for the Mumbai outrage).
In such a scenario, the western reaction would be to pay lip service to assuage Indian anger, a few C130s of relief material, a slap on the wrist to the Pakistanis and tremendous pressure on Indians to not disrupt the Afghan war effort.
Finally, in conclusion, the reason why the Pakistani Army does not engage the Taliban is because ideologically, they are kin. No amount of Indian posturing and ‘calling their bluff’ is going to change that. The only reason for the PA to fight the Taliban and AlQaeda is for them to feel threatened about their way of lives by the Taliban advances.
The western powers are ruthless in their goal to keep their cities safe and can countenance any number of Indian casualties towards that end. Its just collateral damage to them. No amount of Indian cooperation with these powers is going to change this western attitude.
The dharmic Indian approach of showing these powers the error of their ways is not going to work. Only ruthless statecraft will.
No amount of effort on India’s part will convince Pakistan.It will continue to come up with excuses. It is time Pakistani rulers turned their efforts to improving life in Pakistan itself. This is Jane from Israeli Uncensored News.
Nitin
I first thought it was weekday levity from you.
I appreciate your ‘strategic thinking’.
What do you suggest we do if:
1. Tomorrow Taliban controls an area which has a common border with India, say near Punjab [very possible] and Pak Army says India need to remove the recon equipment and Sukhois from Jalandhar AFB [a step ahead of the above post] so as to make them efficiently fight back Taliban.
2. US urges India to do the same in the interests of the free-world.
Sudeep
How can the Pakistanis claim that they are afraid of the Indians when the Indian posture is as defense oriented as it can be, given the circumstances?
Risk and threat perception is subjective. In a blog post I wrote as a prelude to this piece, I argued that at one level the Pakistani insecurity is structural. We cannot hope to convince the Pakistani GHQ. The point is not to try to convince them. The point is to call their bluff (and that of the Americans who want to give them the benefit of the doubt).
Even if – as you say – we call the Pakistanis bluff and remove everything that they consider to be threatening to them from the border, what is the guarantee that Pakistanis will then take effective steps to fight the Taliban?
There’s no guarantee. In fact, we argue in the very beginning of the piece that they can’t. It is only when the fig leafs fall off that the United States will have to face this reality.
Lets say we remove what we consider to be all offensive formations from the border and there is a unconventional terrorist spectacular in India. It will take weeks (possibly months) for us to bring any military pressure to bear on Pakistan.
This is contingent on the logic that offensive formations at the border work to deter attacks and compel Pakistan to prosecute those who conduct them. Perhaps there is empirical evidence for this?
If we call the Pakistanis bluff and force them to engage the Taliban, what stops an ambitious and tactically brilliant Pakistani Army or ISI commander to set up an [b]unconventional[/b] terrorist spectacular in India, specifically to provide an excuse to turn around their forces and bring them back to their Eastern border? (there are indications that this is the true reason for the Mumbai outrage).
Nothing. What stops him now, or if we don’t? If 26/11 was anything, it was a way to make it an India-Pakistan match. That’s what the jihadis wan’t. That’s why we shouldn’t do what they want.
Finally, in conclusion, the reason why the Pakistani Army does not engage the Taliban is because ideologically, they are kin. No amount of Indian posturing and ‘calling their bluff’ is going to change that
Precisely. Where we differ is on what the US will do about it. Of course, if we create the conditions for the US to lose, they’ll lose, and they’ll cut and run. That’s not in our interests. We should help the United States go the whole nine yards and dismantle the Pakistani MJC.
Note to readers:
Before you comment, please check through the discussion to see if the point has already been addressed.
We need to convince International Community that Pakistani Militants who endanger India are NOT same as Taliban, there is no common threat to India and Pak from Taliban hence this pullout is not possible without Punjabi terror infrastructure in Muridke is dismantled!!
Hi,
I’m inclined to wonder why it is assumed that the US will react to an Indian withdrawal from the border?
It is true that the US is aware that Indian troops are on the border and have a war plan calling for an immediate attack on Pakistan, if India is attacked. After all, the Pakistanis tell the US this {without stressing the “If India is attacked”}. But if India withdraws, it won’t be in the interest of the Pakistanis to stress that. The withdrawal will just be a fact. Without a larger plan to insure that the US elite sees the withdrawal as a sign of India’s willingness to cooperate with the US, it might be interpreted as a purely internal decision by India’s military to redeploy.
It would also be a good idea to approach the US to see what you can get for the withdrawal. The reason for this is that if India moves back from the border without the US elite buying this concession, the US elite has no stake in the decision and might not care much how the Pakistanis react. If the US pays, even sightly, for an Indian withdrawal from the border, then it becomes something the US got for Pakistan. If the US elite buys a retreat as an Indian concession, the US will be much more annoyed when the Pakistanis decide it is unimportant. Also, of course, India will be running a risk if it pulls back. It might as well try to get something for that risk.
Actually, of course, the Pakistanis would be right in the wargaming sense. India is highly unlikely to retreat its forces far enough so that it is unable to attack in less time than Pakistani troops fighting insurgents can be redeployed. In fact, there is some chance that the Pakistanis would see this as an Indian trap, and offer this theory to their US supporters. The trap theory will be much more plausible if India is nice enough to redeploy its forces away from the border without US concessions than if the US buys the redeployment as a concession from an apparently reluctant India.
But as usual, I’m tending to go on here. If you want to read more from me, you might want to look at my blog, above.
The point is to call their bluff (and that of the Americans who want to give them the benefit of the doubt).
You can’t wake a person who is pretending to be asleep due to their strategic motives.
Of course, if we create the conditions for the US to lose, they’ll lose, and they’ll cut and run. That’s not in our interests.
Can you explain why this is not in our interests? I would imagine getting the US/NATO/Brits out of the region will complete the process of getting independence from colonial/imperial rule.
Or is the problem that India does not have the foggiest about what to do after the Euros eventually leave?
Dear Nitin
Semantics aside, “disbanding the army” and placing the army at a position of disadvantage are one and the same thing.
I note that you have great faith that the Pakistani army takes India’s nuclear threat seriously. May I point out that this did not happen in 1999? What has changed since then?
At the risk of self advertisement, may I ask you to, time permitting, to go through an e-book I have written on Pakistan.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/EBOOKS/pfs.pdf
@@Nitin
Thanks for responding, hoping for an invigorating exchange.
>> This is contingent on the logic that offensive formations at the border work to deter attacks and compel Pakistan to prosecute those who conduct them. Perhaps there is empirical evidence for this?
There is. In fact, this is the only kind of negotiating that has worked, to any extent with Pakistan.
>> Nothing. What stops him now, or if we don’t? If 26/11 was anything, it was a way to make it an India-Pakistan match. That’s what the jihadis wan’t. That’s why we shouldn’t do what they want.
Our response should be predicated on one and only one thing, how to preserve the lives of our citizens. What the Jihadis or the Americans want or think is immaterial.
An operation parakram in reverse boils down to this. We refuse to respond to any Jihadi outrage thereby depriving the Pakistanis of any excuse to station PA troops on their eastern border. This will trigger faultlines in the PA itself, thereby triggering a confrontation between the US and the Jihadi complex, the result of which is immaterial since it will be tremendously disruptive to forces inimical to India.
IMO, by doing this, we leave ourselves open to ever greater and ever more spectacular attacks, in the hopes of provoking the semblance of a military confrontation. Its immaterial whether the confrontation actually takes place, just the chance of it happening would give enough of a fig leaf for the Pakistanis to claim a threatening posture from India and start a redeployment. Jihadi spectaculars will become a cheap out for PA, whenever they feel like it, they would launch an attack, and redeploy citing an India threat that exists only in their minds. Such a deployment would be plausible, even reasonable, since who can tell how India would react if a Chemical Weapon is unleashed on Delhi?
Precisely to deter this, we should not take any option off the table and instead adopt a mad-dog Donald Rumsfeld approach. Our responses should be unpredictable, unconventional and disproportionate in all dimensions (time/location/scale/type). A military presence on the border and the cold start doctrine form an essential part of this approach. With such a posture, there is always a chance of a heavy cost being paid by the PA for any misadventure. Without hard power, whatever else you do lacks any credibility.
Secondly, this posture will also enable is to extract concessions from the Americans, because by keeping the border calm, we are helping them achieve their goals.
>> Precisely. Where we differ is on what the US will do about it. Of course, if we create the conditions for the US to lose, they’ll lose, and they’ll cut and run. That’s not in our interests. We should help the United States go the whole nine yards and dismantle the Pakistani MJC.
But have the Americans realized that they need to dismantle the Pakistani MJC for their own security? all indications are, they havent yet. For e.g. Holbrookes recent statement that the Mumbai attackers were from ‘the western Pakistan region’ when all of them were Punjabi. The only thing that the Americans want is security for their own citizens, not to loose face and a reasonably fast resolution of the conflict.
If they were convinced that they need to dismantle the Punjabi Taliban (LeT, JeM,..) as opposed to the Pashtun Taliban and AlQaeda, India army or no Indian army, they would have forced the Pakistanis to do that. (Recall the story of the Wolf and the Lamb http://www.2020site.org/aesop/story2.html). Actions of the powerful are not bound by reason.
Semantics aside, “disbanding the army” and placing the army at a position of disadvantage are one and the same thing.
That is not a reasonable argument.
As you seem to suggest, I have not advocated the total removal of conventional defence and total reliance on nuclear deterrence. You are not refuting my argument, but a theoretical one you have constructed by stretching mine to the ridiculous extreme. (Drink less beer doesn’t mean don’t drink beer. So an argument against prohibition is not a valid counter-argument for an argument for drinking in moderation).
I’m not saying that what we advocate will be risk free. I’m just saying that we can run that risk.
I think the main point, Nitin, is that Pakistan will always find some excuse however ridiculous, whether it’s strike formations or afghan consulates. They do not fight the taliban because they do not perceive it in their interest to do so. Nothing will make them reconsider. If the US can’t convince them, do you think India can? The taliban are a strategic asset. A cheap weapon that due to ideology and tribal affiliation has the capacity to wear out or wait out superpowers. Rather than lending credence to pakistani shenanigans, i think it would be better to discuss how independent sindhi and baluchi republics need to be created. Also, you should note that as per the ndeal (sorry, i know you asked not to bring it up, but one last thing), india is closing down dhruv and will eventually cutoff fissile production (FMCT on its way). While that is going on, this is what pakistan is upto: link
Thank you MMS for your “Principled stand”. “History will not forgive us”. Please recognize that pakistan now realizes that it is going down, and its goal is to do everything it can (conventional and nuclear) to bring India down with it. Please start writing articles in the mint about Contingency situations to deal with increased refugees in the event that pakistan breaks up, etc. Calls for troop drawdowns only give more ammunition for arundhati roy, et al…Because after drawdown, the next step will be siachen (this as you know almost happened thanks to the upa in 2006), if not the entire valley. Also, the more time India spends on fencing with Pak, the more likely China is to claiming Genghis Khan’s mantle…
link
Also, one last thing for those of you in the media to note:
link
“Pak attacking India will face International Isolation”..
give me a break..! Words dont matter..Pak traded nuclear know-how around the world for billions of dollars and what about “international isolation”?
We are not running a govt preserving India’s interests not an “American idol” popularity contest! If we move troops from the border, Pak Army will be tempted to do another Mumbai.. may be many times in magnitude..
Who will take the responsibility for those deaths..
Since our troops are in striking distance with Pak Taliban up their ass..they will show more caution..since we can strike fast before they can spell “cry baby”..And yes striking Pak and removing their offensive capability is a strategic option!
Sudeep,
The discussion is engaging, if those of us who have similar objectives are willing to set aside long-held positions. I think all that needs to be said has been said on this thread, so I’m making some concluding remarks.
I cannot claim to know what the jihadis, Pakistan, US or India are thinking; and neither can I predict what will happen in future. I analyse the situation in terms of likelihoods and risks, costs & benefits. I do not have the certitude to say X, Y, Z will happen only that it might happen. With that pre-amble…
What the Jihadis or the Americans want or think is immaterial. But it is. Not being sensitive to their strategies risks getting into a situation at a time and place of their choosing. I think playing down the threat of war after 26/11 was a smart thing to do: but playing dossier-dossier was not. If the Americans want to hammer Pakistan, I’d like them to do so without hindrance. Protecting our people doesn’t mean having to do it all ourself.
An operation parakram in reverse boils down to this. We refuse to respond to any Jihadi outrage thereby depriving the Pakistanis of any excuse to station PA troops on their eastern border. This will trigger faultlines in the PA itself, thereby triggering a confrontation between the US and the Jihadi complex the result of which is immaterial since it will be tremendously disruptive to forces inimical to India.
I’m glad you agree. I think there is a high chance of it playing it out this way.
IMO, by doing this, we leave ourselves open to ever greater and ever more spectacular attacks, in the hopes of provoking the semblance of a military confrontation.
Yes, there’s a risk of that. But objectively, I see the risk of the same even if we don’t move our troops. With regard to these attacks, I do not think the position of our strike corps matters in the current context.
But have the Americans realized that they need to dismantle the Pakistani MJC for their own security? all indications are, they havent yet.
Yes, and that’s what we argue too. So shouldn’t we be trying to make them realise this and take the logical next step? Or will we keep indulge in self-fulfilling prophecies: the Americans won’t realise it, so let’s not help them to.
I think India should have a strategic rethink and stop giving so much weight to the Pakistani threat. Agreed, there are certain complete nutters in the Pak army, who can think of nothing beyond attacking India. But this threat is extremely minor as compared to the nature of threats that a country of India’s stature faces.
I completely support Nitin’s thesis that our troops should be drawn back from the Pak border. But this is not about calling Pak’s bluff or winning some American support. This is about a strategic reassessment of the nature of India’s threat vis-a-vis our neighbors.
India can administer a thrashing defeat to Pakistan if and when it decides to call war. This is obvious by a look of the corresponding defense assets. The only thing that might save Pakistan from obliteration is the nuclear button, and that’s why it guards it so close. I say we should give them free air and let them think about their own strategic survival threats.
About India, our biggest threat comes from two fronts (1) terrorist attacks from loosely coordinated groups which operate beyond anybody’s ambit (2) trade warfare with major powers like China and USA.
We should be realistic about both these threats, and we should redeploy our defense accordingly. The first threat is highly dangerous, and we need our army presence around urban centers (in anti-terrorism units) acting in full concert with the state police. Such fiascos as what happened during the Mumbai attacks (when it took one whole day for the special forces to land in Mumbai) cannot be tolerated anymore.
The second threat is sublime and we should have a strategy department in the ministry of trade, possibly linked to the army. This department should assess threats on the international market-place (including the financial and monetary sectors) and strive to protect Indian interests. There should be a dedicated department to handle cyber warfare. It is a pity to watch how Indian websites fall prey to hackers every single day.
This modernization of the Indian army and the strategic reassessment of our threats should be done ASAP. An obsession with Pakistan is not good for our system. Let’s not lose our sleep over these poor suckers.
—On the contrary India must up it’s ante – the message should be clear – if eliminating terrorism is gonna be selective, then we take care of ours & you of your…
Hi,
On reflection, this idea makes a fair amount of sense.
India adopted a forward deployment on the theory that it would deter war because it was ready to invade Pakistan immediately.
A group in Pakistan, supported by elements of the ISI and presumably elements of the army, decided that they wanted a war with India. They did their best to start one by attacking Mumbai on11/26.
India decided it did not want to be baited into war, given the existing balance of forces.
This makes the pre 11/26 deployment of forces questionable. To the extent that it sends a message to Pakistanis that India is ready to attack Pakistan, it helps to avoid war if and only if the Pakistanis don’t want war. But apparently some Pakistanis really do want war. To the extent that the current Indian deployment really reflects a willingness to attack Pakistan, it offers Pakistanis who want war with India a way to impose their preference on Pakistanis who don’t want war with India. If they do something sufficiently outrageous {11/26 for example}, India will attack and the other Pakistanis will fight to defend themselves.
Now the actual solution to this mess is in Pakistan. Obviously, the cautious Pakistanis need to get control of the ISI and keep the LeT on a short leash. In the absence of this, there may not be much reason for India to encourage the belief of reckless Pakistanis that they can impose war with India on cautious Pakistanis by 11/26 style terrorist attacks.
Ray,
a. We know that the Pakistanis are not going to respond to any perceived troop withdrawal in any constructive fashion-they are unlikely to remove their armies from their eastern border.
b. It is only now that J&K is gradually returning to normal. Increased infiltration will threaten these gains.
c. Previous attempts by India to make matters better (more peaceful) have resulted in major terrorist attacks/Kargil. Such things inevitably cost Indian lives.
d. The only reason to do this is to play to or appease half baked American “AfPak” policy.
Why should we do this again? What do we gain? From my perspective, we lose a lot but gain nothing.
Very interesting example of out-of-the-box thinking. At least you guys are thinking proactively as opposed to the whining status quo-ism you see in most “strategic” discussions.
The point is not whether this is the best idea or not (although I am sympathetic to your logic). The point is that new ideas are being proposed and discussed which is very commendable. Most “strategic” analyses in our media put me to sleep immmediately.
Army on standby is only a temporary solution. With Obama funding even Pak nuclear expansion and playing a bully with regard to our internal affairs, Only solution is a fully-fledged covert-operation to destabilize and dismember Pakistan. Otherwise, US will keep bankrolling the terrorist state and 1000s of us(more) will die(each year) for Pak’s “insecurity problems”. A loony Pak general (which is pretty much all of them) holding nukes and a taliban commander holding nukes..as far as we are concerned is the same…
I think the theory that somehow an artificial state like Pak should be kept alive artificially doesnt make sense..If we have waited long long enough for pakis to improve their behaviour..but they have not yet shaken off their obsession..and with Indian economy and its global power growing..they will be more suicidal and negative.. Peace process with Pak is the biggest joke of all times..
After I had read your article, I thought, hmm… well, you know your stuff and I probably shouldnt even bother commenting on it. But there was always that doubt rankling somewhere about a deal between army and Taliban… though I dissmissed it thinking there was a slim chance of that happening.
And then, I read this rediff article .
What say now?
Lets call China’s bluff too, by pulling out troops away from the LAC in the North-East as well as from entire state of Arunachal.
Was Ambala cantt created recently to have Indian Strike Core ? ( I suppose Ambala is near to the border than Mathura & Bhopal)
Really, I got confused; I thought Ambala cantt exists for decades. But from the blog post & comments, it looks as if the cantt was setup recently, which triggered fear in Pak minds.
US can achieve the same objective by giving security guarantee to Pakistan in case of Indian attack. That should effectively eliminate any pretense of Pakistani fear. It’s not like we’re going to attack Pakistan anyway, and the US knows it all too well.
“And even if the Pakistan army irrationally tries to exploit the Indian move by launching a conventional attack along the border— it will be hopelessly isolated internationally,..”
—No, they’ll fill in the vacuum with military personnel’s disguised as jihadi’s & the international community will give us mere lip service & cite the ‘K’ word…
Although the author has time & again been giving the impression that India’s ‘national interests’ rest upon bending backwards for the Americans, this article is the most ludicrous of the lot, now he advocates that like spineless creatures we must play ball for their whims & fancies…& all this in the nations interest.
Socal,
Sure, the US can achieve the same objective by offering a security guarantee. Such a guarantee, I’m sure you will agree, is not in India’s interests.