Reforming the home ministry’s troops

In my DNA column – why India’s paramilitary forces need structural reform

This is an excerpt from the article that appears in today’s DNA.

Why do we need BSF for the border with Pakistan, but separate forces called ITBP for the border with China and the Sashastra Seema Bal for the borders with Nepal and Bhutan? Why should the Assam Rifles be distinct from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)? My colleague Bibhu Prasad Routray argues that it is a good idea to merge the various central paramilitary forces into a single force. Indeed, given that most of them are doing each others’ jobs anyway, wouldn’t it make sense to bring them under one chain of command? If this is way too radical, then why not rationalise them into three forces with distinct roles—internal security, border security and infrastructure security? This is as good for accountability as it is for the forces to develop greater competence within their domains.

In fact, massive expansion of central paramilitary forces without structural reforms could end up being counterproductive. The most important links in the internal security chain are the beat constable, the local police station and the deputy superintendent of police. Policing is a state subject. The massive expansion of central para-military forces after 26/11 belies the total refusal of all state governments to implement the Supreme Court-ordered police reforms. Indian states persist with a colonial police structure designed to keep a subject population under the rulers’ thumb. Persuading them to change is hard enough. If a state government comes to believe that it has easy access to large numbers of central forces, it will have fewer incentives to improve its own police force.

The goal of internal security should not be about sending the CRPF (and certainly not the BSF) to Hyderabad. It should be about ensuring that the Andhra Pradesh police can handle the task without outside help. [DNA]

Risk of youth bulge unrest in India

The inaugural piece of my new fortnightly monthly column in DNA

Yesterday, I wrote about how to spot the next revolution. Demographics was one indicator. Specifically the existence of a youth bulge (young people constituting a large fraction of the total population) has been found to be correlated with high levels of unrest and violence.

“What about India?” many asked. At 26, the median Indian is not only older than the median Middle Eastern Arab, but will cross 31 by the year 2026. Rising opportunities, growing incomes, a hopeful mindset, democracy and freedom of expression mean that the chances of mass unrest are slim.

But it’s important not to be caught up with the good news in the big picture, for the macro data masks the variation at the micro level. In the first installment of my new fortnightly column in DNA, I argue that the data are serious enough for us to consider youth bulge violence as a long-term risk to national security, and that the time to take mitigatory steps is now.

The dark side of the demographic dividend: So demographics might partly explain why the countries of the Middle East are unstable, but why should it concern us? Well, because the youth bulge phenomenon might put at serious risk India’s ability to benefit from the celebrated “demographic dividend”. If reasonably healthy and reasonably educated young people do not find enough opportunities then India has an abundance of grievances available to agitate them. While the 15-24 population of India as a whole will peak this year and then decline over the next decade, there are many parts of the country where the age structure indicates the risk of youth bulge unrest.

…the data are sufficient enough for us to regard youth bulge violence as a long-term risk to national security. Going by the National Commission on Population’s projections to the year 2026, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi will experience a net increase in young people. The numbers in the 15-24 age group will grow in Bihar, Assam, Haryana, Uttaranchal, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Gujarat. States that cannot both reduce grievances and create enough opportunities are likely to get into trouble. [DNA]

You should also look at Dilip Rao’s insightful post at Law and Other Things that I cite in my article.