Off to Somalia

The Navy is off, with helicopters & marine commandos

It is nice to know that they listened.

But the details are confusing. In the Times of India, Rajat Pandit reports that the INS Tabar, a Talwar-class guided missile frigate, is already in the Gulf of Aden and a new ship (INS Ganga?)will be sent to replace it. The new ship will have helicopters and a detachment of marine commandos, suggesting that it is equipped for the job. But the absence of an accompanying tanker might indicate the duration of the mission is short, or cooperation with other navies in the region.

Mr Pandit’s report then says that the government gave permission for “formal anti-piracy patrols” yesterday. So what was INS Tabar doing there before that?

Finally, Mr Pandit shouldn’t get too caught up with interpreting what international law says about entering Somalian waters. Jus cogens provides a prima facie case and the UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and the Somalian president have provided legal cover. What matters is whether India has the resolve, and whether other powers will object. The first is now settled. The second was not an issue in this case.

My op-ed in Mail Today: Send the Navy to tackle Somali pirates

India must act to protect its interests off Somalia

In today’s op-ed in Mail Today, I argue that India must be the ultimate protector of its citizens, wherever they might be on the planet.

ACCORDING to the International Maritime Bureau, pirates have attacked 69 ships off the coast of Somalia since January this year. They hijacked 27 and are currently holding 11 of them for ransom. Along with the ships and their cargo, they are holding more than 200 sailors hostage, of whom at least 18, including Captain P K Goyal of MT Stolt Valor, are Indian nationals. At least two Indian owned ships have been lost off these waters since 2006. A piracy-powered economy has developed in the Puntland region of Somalia, astride a corridor that carries a significant part of the worlds—and India’s—seaborne trade.
Continue reading “My op-ed in Mail Today: Send the Navy to tackle Somali pirates”

We will negotiate but we won’t

Is the government confused on handling the hostage crisis in Somalia or is it just confused reporting?

The pirates holding the crew of MV Stolt Valor have apparently issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the owners of the ship.

Under pressure, Indian Government was forced to react and Anand Sharma, MoS, External Affairs has said that India is being helped by neighbouring powers and international agencies were working with India to free sailors.

Earlier, the Defence Minister had categorically ruled out an offensive in the high seas saying that the Indian government was banking on negotiations to resolve the crisis. The statement had prompted angry families to ask if authorities were even considering ransom as a final option.

Government had also said that the government views Somali pirates as terrorists and as a policy will not negotiate with them. However, the government had assured that they will do everything to save the lives of the Indian citizens. [TOI]

Little did one know that the government’s much touted (and flouted) “no negotiations” policy would end up this way. It won’t send the Navy, and will rely on negotiations, but at the same time, it won’t negotiate with hostage takers because that is the policy. That means that the government won’t actually do anything, other than rely on commercial negotiations, neighbouring powers and international agencies.

But it’ll still send peacekeepers to the Congo…in the service of an ideal. The policy on overseas military deployments could certainly do with some rationalisation.

Let’s hope the above report is inaccurate. Because such a mix of apathy, pusillanimity and cravenness is well and truly unbearable. [A friend mentions seeing reports of the dispatch of a Navy ship. But it is unlikely that the ships can get there in 48 hours]

When India used to secure Somalia’s Red Sea coast

And why it must do so again

The pirates of Puntland made the strategic mistake of becoming too successful. And they also ran out of luck, when among the vessels they hijacked was one carrying a huge arms shipment, and another something mysteriously important. And suddenly, the world’s navies with the capability to get there—save India’s—decided that it was time to sail to go pirate hunting (or, at the very least, pirate watching) in the Red Sea. The US navy is already there. The Russian navy is on its way (and may well demonstrate some muscle in the days ahead). Even the European Union “is setting up an anti-piracy taskforce to help protect the lawless sea lanes off east Africa.”

Now, piracy off Somalia presents both threat to humanitarian relief operations, international security and to international commerce. And both the UN security council and the president of Somalia have called for the international community to take an interest in patrolling the region. And as Seth Weinberger writes, suo motu action against pirates has legal sanction under international law.

Piracy is one of the clearest examples of jus cogens, a preemptory norm that creates a crime for which there is no possible justification and for which there is universal jurisdiction. Thus, anyone who wishes to act against the pirates is legally allowed to do so. However, that creates a problem—in the absence of a specific jurisdiction, no one has the responsibility or strong incentive to act (why should one state bear the cost of enforcement when the cost of piracy falls on many?). [Security Dilemmas]

The question, though, is how long these navies will stay in the region. While the United States and its allies have the logistics and support infrastructure in the region, other naval forces will have to work out arrangements if they are to maintain forces for an extended period of time.

Amid all this, the Indian government is demonstrating an inexplicable reluctance to dispatch the Indian navy to the waters off Somalia. Not only does this position disregard the threat to India’s interests in the region, it also ignores the fact that a century ago, it was the (British) Indian navy that used to secure the Red Sea.

During the prime mininstership of William Gladstone in the 1880s, it was decided that the Indian government should be responsible for administering the Somaliland protectorate because the Somali coast’s strategic location on the Gulf of Aden was important to India. Customs taxes helped pay for India’s patrol of Somalia’s Red Sea Coast. [David D Laitin/LOC]

According to retired Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, “it is almost impossible, and prohibitively expensive, for the Indian Navy to send two warships and a tanker, some 2,000 nm from our west coast, and keep them on patrol for 365 days a year in the “safety corridor”. He argues that apart from placing armed “Sea Marshalls” on board commercial ships passing through the region, the Indian navy should partner those of the west and Russia to patrol the region.

The long-term solution, of course, lies on land: extricating Somalia from its civil war, and stabilising the entire Horn of Africa. That’s a tall order. In the meantime, it is necessary to contain the Somali pirates. There is a clear case to deploy the Indian Navy in the Red Sea off the coast of Somalia, with rules of engagement that include hot pursuit. Indeed, there is a clear case to task the marine commandos with hostage-rescue missions where Indian ships and nationals are taken hostage.

Related Links: On INI, Pragmatic Euphony has more. Information Dissemination & Eagle1 are two excellent blogs covering maritime security issues. A Chatham House paper by Roger Middleton on the subject.

Pirates of Puntland

India must secure its maritime interests off the Horn of Africa

Among the tasks assigned to the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150)—an international naval task force comprising, among others, of US, British, French, Pakistani and Bahraini ships—are maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. While its purpose is to deny the use of the seas to smugglers and terrorists the main problem in the area under its watch is piracy.

CTF-150 doesn’t have enough ships to secure one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. So it advises large, slower vessels to travel in convoys so that it can better watch over them. But since this is not always possible, around one in 500 ships fall victim to pirates. Since the monthly traffic is around 1500, pirates succeed in raiding three or four ships each month.

The proceeds from these raids have sparked off a boom in Puntland, on the Horn of Africa.

Whenever word comes out that pirates have taken yet another ship in the Somali region of Puntland, extraordinary things start to happen.

There is a great rush to the port of Eyl, where most of the hijacked vessels are kept by the well-armed pirate gangs.

People put on ties and smart clothes. They arrive in land cruisers with their laptops, one saying he is the pirates’ accountant, another that he is their chief negotiator. [‘BBC’]

Indian ships, cargoes and sailors have been affected by piracy off Somalia in recent years. Even without considering the linkages to international terrorism, there is a case for the Indian navy to help secure shipping lanes and Indian interests in that region. The Indian government must quickly approve the Navy’s proposals (via interim thoughts)to begin patrolling waters off Africa’s eastern coast.