Trends from 2002
The 218-km road connecting Delaram (on the Kandahar-Herat highway) to Zaranj, on the border with Iran has been completed (via Swami Iyer). The strategic importance of this road—as news reports never fail to mention—is to provide landlocked Afghanistan an alternative access to the sea, allowing it to break free from Pakistan’s traditional stranglehold.
Since this route passes through several hundred kilometres of Iranian territory before connecting to Chabahar on the Persian Gulf, it remains to be seen if Iran will prove to be a better neighbour than Pakistan. From a purely economic standpoint though, Afghanistan should benefit from the competition between the two routes.
There is a lot of hope pinned on this alternative route. For Afghanistan, this is an opportunity to regain better access to the Indian market that it lost in 1947. For India, it is an opportunity to regain better access to Central Asia that it too lost in 1947. To the extent that Pakistan remains wedded to its traditional strategic rent-seeking behaviour it is likely to attempt to foil these plans. And as the attack on the Indian embassy has shown, it remains wedded to old tactics as much as it is to old strategies.
This being so, it is strange that the India should be considering withdrawing four companies (around 400 personnel) of the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police currently deployed in Afghanistan. There is a case for a robust Indian military presence in Afghanistan; with force levels carefully calibrated, on the one hand to secure Indian interests, and on the other, to avoid being seen by the local population as an ‘occupying’ force. Reducing India’s military presence at a critical phase in Afghanistan’s counter-insurgency war is uncalled for at this stage.
The Indian National Interest community launches its first policy brief
Climate Change and National Security: Preparing India for New Conflict Scenarios
The global debate on whether there is indeed a process of anthropogenic climate change in progress has been for the most part settled by the international scientific consensus surrounding the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. The trajectory of global warming is expected to have a major impact on human society as a whole: calling for a co-ordinated international response towards mitigation and adaptation to a warmer planet.
This policy brief analyses how climate change will affect regional security in the Indian subcontinent and implications for India’s national security. It argues that glacial melt, rising sea levels and extreme weather will exacerbate ongoing conflicts and will require India to develop military capabilities to address a range of new strategic scenarios: from supporting international co-operation, to managing a ‘hot peace’, to outright military conflict.
Get the document from the INI Policy Briefs section.
And the cost of lost opportunities
For all its rhetoric about protecting rural India, when the real opportunity came, the UPA government decided to deprive the farmer of a chance of making a better livelihood.
Now everyone knows that rising food prices are bad for the economy, and very much so for the poor. Yet it is possible to protect those at greatest risk through the use of targeted food subsidies and even direct cash transfers. Such an approach would have been doubly beneficial: first, farmers would have enjoyed greater incomes from high international prices and second, farmers would have responded to the price signal by growing more food-grains, thereby increasing the global supply and helping check inflation.
Barring exports was the dumb thing to do. It harms farmers. It prevents them from making more money at a time when they could have made more money. It prevents them from investing in better seeds, fertilisers and farming technology that could increase agricultural productivity (India’s is among the lowest in Asia). Capturing productivity gains would have had long-term benefits.
In its “new deal for global food policy” the World Bank says as much:
While higher grain prices are clearly a burden to poor net purchasers of food, they also present an opportunity to stimulate foodgrain production and enhance the contribution of agriculture to medium-run growth. For example, higher prices weaken the rationale for costly floor prices or import tariffs for grain, and may facilitate the implementation of politically difficult trade reforms. Higher grain prices can also help to reverse a generally declining trend in government, private sector and donor investment in the agricultural sector.
Agricultural producers such as Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand have made significant progress in agricultural commercialization in recent years, and have increasingly undertaken investments in research and extension necessary to promote increased agricultural productivity and reduced agricultural risk.
However, some of the short-run policy options discussed above may limit the scope for longer-term solutions. For example, policy responses that seek to control markets through mandated grain prices, export restrictions, forcible procurement, or direct government involvement in marketing activities are likely to lower the food supply response over the medium term. In contrast, alternative measures such as the piloting of market-based risk management tools in Malawi, and the improvement of publicly accessible market information systems in India and Mali, are all likely to mobilize significant new resources in the private sector to cut marketing costs and improve efficiency of grain markets over the medium term. [WB]
Cite Pakistan’s failure and draw your favourite conclusion
What’s with editors of leading Indian newspapers? After Mr Gupta, the articulate Vir Sanghvi falls into the same trap: of declaring that democracy is better than dictatorship (linkthanks Pragmatic) and then tripping up while attempting to draw other conclusions. This time about the fates of states vis-a-vis their policy towards the United States.
There were only two major Asian countries that rejected the US prescription for development and foreign policy: India and China. And look where they are today. And look at America’s client states.
Of course, Nehru made mistakes. But can anybody really deny that the principal reason why India and Pakistan, once part of the same country, have followed such divergent paths is because of the choices both countries made in the years following independence?
At first, India’s priorities may have seemed (from a middle-class perspective) wrong-headed and muddled. Pakistan’s may have seemed glamorous and instantly gratifying. But, in the long run, we ended up as the superpower. And Pakistan as the failed state. [HT]
Leave aside that India is far from being a superpower. But citing Pakistan to prove that America’s ‘client’ states in Asia have done badly for themselves is shoddy analysis. Japan and South Korea too were American ‘client’ states in the second half of the twentieth century. Look where they are today. And look at us. South Korea, mind you, was a military dictatorship—much like Pakistan—for much of that time. That, it turns out, did not prevent it from jumping from a poor country to a rich one within the span of one generation. And then look at Taiwan and the other Asian Tigers—it turns out that pro-American states have done rather well for themselves.
Just as it is wrong to blame the United States for Pakistan’s failure, it is wrong to credit Nehru with India’s relative success. Assessing Nehru’s role in India’s development requires the space of several books. But one would think it reasonable to credit several hundred million ordinary people of India for doing little things right that contributed to their country being where it is. It is also reasonable to blame a small number of people for doing big things wrong that left India much behind what it could have been.
Pakistan’s situation could arguably be used to highlight the importance of democracy. But this is not an issue in India. But Mr Sanghvi appears to use it to justify a lot of things in omnibus. Therein lies the danger of comparing India to Pakistan. Almost anything will compare favourably. The irony is that Mr Sanghvi does this in an article that starts off by saying how the whole world, include Indians themselves, don’t make this comparison anymore.
The onward march of communal socialism
The UPA’s most unfortunate strategy of earmarking government expenditure along community lines continues apace. The latest in this juggernaut is the Prime Minister’s 15-point programme for the welfare of minorities. It contains, among other things, measures to allocate greater resources for the teaching of Urdu, for modernising Madrasa education, for quotas in the rural employment guarantee programmes, preferential bank loans, government jobs and why, even a quota for upgrading of slums. That’s not just an assault on good economic sense. It’s a naked assault on secularism.
Prevention and control of communal riots is an excellent policy goal. But it is a national policy goal. To place it as a ‘minority welfare measure’ is not only an affront to justice. It is counterproductive to the cause of communal harmony, as earmarking justice—in the same style as jobs, loans and slum upgrading—will deepen the suspicion that it won’t be even-handed.
One person challenged Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on this patently anti-secular socialist policy:
“The New 15-Point Programme that focuses on earmarking certain outlays of various developmental schemes and programmes of the Government of India amongst the eligible beneficiaries, based on their minority status, should be reviewed in the interest of maintaining the social fabric of the nation.”
“Such discrimination, amongst the eligible beneficiaries, for flow of funds based on minority status, will not help the cause in taking people of India together on the path of development,” he said.
(He asked) the Prime Minister how was “religion important” for a government strategy on inclusive growth.
Wondering “what has gone wrong in the previous plans” that such an approach should be adopted, (he) said “poverty has no religion” and only poverty should determine allocations in the Plan. [IE]
That person was Chief Minister Narendra Modi of Gujarat. The prime minister waffled in response. And Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, didn’t even realise the irony of what he said in defence of the 15-point programme:
Ahluwalia later said “one of the instruments being used is to make special efforts to focus on districts where there is high concentration of minorities” and these programmes “do not involve discrimination in favour of minorities as such.” [IE]
What’s the difference, Montek?